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A central indicator of governance and state capacity is the ability of the government to ensure 
access to basic services. This review looks at the current capability of the state of Iraq to deliver 
public services. The review draws heavily on a number of recent World Bank Group reports, in 
particular the recent Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) of Iraq carried out in 2017 (see World 
Bank, 2017; World Bank Group 2018a, 2018b). Iraqis have witnessed a dramatic deterioration in 
most basic services: electricity, water and sanitation, health, education, transportation, and 
especially security. Iraq is ethnically, religiously, and regionally diverse, and conflict has led to 
more pronounced spatial differences not only in poverty rates but also in the delivery of services. 
Access to and the quality of services also vary widely across the country. Due to the 
information/literature available and the short timeframe, this review touches briefly on the 
national provision of social protection services, electricity supply, transport, water supply and 
sanitation, health, education and security in Iraq. It then talks in more detail on the regional 
variations in service delivery for the areas of Iraq where recent information was available. 
Other key findings: 
• Much of the literature touched on decentralisation. Once decentralisation is realised, 
provincial governments will be responsible for providing many services with limited 
federal investment or operational funding, except funding for staff salaries (Diamond & 
Berkuti, 2017). However, progress on decentralisation has been slow and ministries vary 
widely in their acceptance of decentralisation, although it is beginning to accelerate.  
• According to the World Bank’s (2017: 20) recent SCD, Iraqis are very dissatisfied with 
their access to basic services. Just 30% of the population is satisfied with the available 
education services, satisfaction with health services is under 20%, and less than 15% of 
the population is content with local security. Effective security provision remains a key 
concern of many Iraqi citizens. 
• Areas affected by the war against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have faced 
immediate and acute food, healthcare, and water-sanitation challenges and wide public 
service provision shortcomings, as well as huge damage and destruction to infrastructure 
and transport links (Mansour, 2018).  
• Although more stable than other parts of Iraq, the southern provinces face challenges 
vis-à-vis the central government. Basra has suffered from power blackouts, drug 
epidemics, the mismanagement of garbage and corruption (Mansour, 2018: 26). Poverty 
is also widespread in the southern provinces despite the oil wealth (World Bank, 2017). 
• The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has faced a number of economic setbacks 
since 2013, including the crash in oil prices, the cost of fighting ISIS and sheltering 
internally displaced people (IDPs), and sharp cuts in revenue transfers from Baghdad, 
that have affected its budgets and service delivery. In particular, this has impacted on the 
ability of the KRG to pay public-sector salaries, resulting in civil unrest. 
• Key barriers and constraints to effective service delivery by the Iraqi government include: 
a lack of institutional and financial capacity; bureaucratic bottlenecks; political patronage 
and corruption in delivery and ownership of resources; low levels of public investment in 
infrastructure and services; the extent of damage and existing infrastructure; and the 
importance of context and local dynamics. 
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This review uses publically available literature and data, and reflects research that was 
completed before the Iraqi parliamentary elections held on 12th May 2018 and hence is not 
reflective of the election results. It is also important to note that the situation in Iraq is 
unpredictable and evolving. This review attempted to use the most recent literature available to 
give the best indication of the current situation in the delivery of public services in Iraq (mostly 
focusing on 2017-2018 published reports). However, due to the fragile situation in Iraq much of 
the data for sectors and different geographical regions is of poor quality or out of date. Where 
possible issues relating to gender have been highlighted, but much of the literature did not go 
into detail. Issues of public service delivery in relation to people with disabilities were not evident 
in the literature reviewed.  
2. National perspective 
Iraq is ethnically, religiously, and regionally diverse. The country.   has 18 governorates and one 
region (the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – a semi-autonomous region in Northern 
Iraq). Each of Iraq’s 18 governorates is subdivided into districts (qadhas) and sub-districts 
(nahiyas). The country can also be divided into five divisions consisting of groups of 
governorates with approximately equal population sizes – Kurdistan, North, Baghdad, Central, 
and South (World Bank, 2017). Access to and the quality of services, including water, electricity, 
education, and health, vary widely across the country. Oil wealth is differentially distributed 
across the country; poverty and welfare are geographically differentiated, as is the impact of 
violent conflict over the past decades Conflict has led to more pronounced spatial differences not 
only in poverty rates but also in the delivery of services (World Bank, 2017: 16-18). 
Against the backdrop of the complete liberation from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)1 in 
December 2017, the KRG referendum on Kurdish independence, and Iraqi forces retaking the 
disputed territory of Kirkuk, the Government of Iraq (GoI) is designing a comprehensive 
reconstruction package. This links immediate stabilisation to a long-term vision and initiation of a 
recovery and reconstruction process (World Bank Group, 2018a: 1). Reconstruction is slowly 
replacing oil production as a driver of growth in the wake of the twin shocks of the ISIS war and 
oil revenue decline which caused a deep recession in the non-oil economy (World Bank Group, 
2018a: 1). 
Federalism and decentralisation 
Since 2003, federalism has been the buzzword in Iraq, with many assuming that this means a 
weak central government and strong provinces. However, to date, federalism beyond the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has not been operationalised, as the realisation has dawned that 
the central government must itself be strong enough to devolve power (LSE Middle East Centre, 
2018: 7).  
Decentralisation deals with the allocation between centre and periphery of power, authority, and 
responsibility for political, fiscal, and administrative systems (see Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2009: 
588). While evidence of its desirability and effects is mixed, country policymakers, often 
supported by international donors, have pursued decentralisation actively for technical, political, 
                                                   
1 Also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic State (IS) or by its Arabic acronym, 
Daesh. 
4 
and financial reasons. Iraq’s constitution allows for a process of decentralisation, and Iraq’s 
parliament passed a provincial powers law in 2008 and revised it in 2013 to devolve the functions 
of eight ministries to the provinces. Decentralisation is intended to improve service delivery and 
address political desires for greater local control (Culbertson & Robinson, 2017: 53). After the 
Iraqi government realises its vision of decentralisation, provincial governments will be 
responsible for providing many services with limited federal investment or operational funding, 
except funding for staff salaries (Diamond & Berkuti, 2017: 4). Progress on decentralisation has 
begun to accelerate. Seven of the eight ministries2 slated for decentralisation under the law have 
now issued ministerial orders for the transfer of their directorates to provincial control (Diamond & 
Berkuti, 2017: 3). Since 2014, USAID has assisted the Iraqi government in realising its vision of 
decentralisation with the Governance Strengthening Program, known locally as Taqadum 
(Diamond & Berkuti, 2017: 1). Prime Minister Abadi and the federal government need to help 
provincial governments become effective and move past sectarianism. However, Prime Minister 
Abadi is trying to manage running a fragmented state, with ministries varying widely in the extent 
to which they accept decentralisation (LSE Middle East Centre, 2018: 8). 
3. Basic service delivery 
A central indicator of governance and state capacity is the ability of the government to ensure 
access to basic services – security, water, electricity, municipal waste collection as well as 
education, health and social assistance services (World Bank, 2017: 20). According to the World 
Bank’s recent Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) of Iraq, Iraqis are very dissatisfied with their 
access to these basic services (World Bank, 2017: 20). Just 30% of the population is satisfied 
with the available education services, satisfaction with health services is under 20%, and less 
than 15% of the population is content with local security. 
Social assistance services  
The three main pillars of the social protection system in Iraq, namely social safety nets, social 
insurance, and labour markets, were conceived individually, with no links or integration. The GoI 
is embarking on a comprehensive reform of its social protection system. 
The Public Distribution System (PDS)  
The entire social protection system is dominated by the Public Distribution System (PDS), an in-
kind program in which the government purchases imported food to distribute to the public. PDS is 
the most important welfare scheme in terms of coverage, poverty alleviation, and the second 
largest in terms of fiscal cost. It is the primary safety net for the poor, though it suffers from 
severe inefficiencies (World Bank, 2017: 85). In 2016, PDS reached approximately 33 million 
people, 90% of households, and its overall cost to the budget was reported at 0.6% of GDP (IMF, 
2017: 11). Since local produce is purchased at administratively set prices, PDS also doubles as 
an agricultural subsidy scheme. Despite excluding high earners from the program, the main 
shortcoming of PDS remains its lack of targeting, which leads to unnecessarily high outlays and 
an inequitable distributional impact (IMF, 2017: 11). The GoI is implementing an ambitious reform 
                                                   
2 The eight ministries targeted for decentralisation were:  Agriculture, Construction and Housing, Education, 
Finance, Health, Labour and Social Affairs, Municipalities and Public Works, and Youth and Sports. 
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to improve targeting of social spending, following the introduction of a proxy means testing (PMT) 
system to identify the poor. The GoI is committed to adopting a unified database of eligible 
households based on the PMT system across all different social protection schemes (World Bank 
Group, 2018b: x). 
Pensions 
In 2016, the GoI introduced to the Council of Representatives (CoR) a new draft Social Insurance 
Law, which expands the coverage and fairness of the pension system and improves its 
sustainability. Iraq’s pension system is fragmented, unequal, costly and unsustainable. Public 
pension spending in Iraq, at around 4% of GDP, is high by international standards (World Bank 
Group, 2018b: 8). Despite such a high cost, the system suffers from large coverage gaps and 
provides overly generous benefits. Pensions reach less than 20% of the poor, while about 85% 
of pension recipients belong to non-poor households. Only about 48% of the total labour force is 
currently contributing to and covered by the pension system. Most covered employees are in the 
public sector, while less than 3% of private sector employees are covered (IMF, 2017: 9; World 
Bank Group, 2018b: 8). 
Public sector wages 
The public sector is the predominant employer in Iraq, and unemployment remains high, 
especially among women and youth. From 2004 to 2014, public sector employment more than 
tripled from 0.9 to 3 million employees. Over the same period, the government wage bill 
ballooned from 7 to 27% of the budget (World Bank Group, 2018b: 8). In 2017, the wage bill is 
estimated to increase to 40% of government budget. This sharp rise in wage expenditures was 
driven largely by unchecked politically backed recruitment and by fraudulent payroll practices, 
including the proliferation of “ghost” workers (not legally employed), and “double dippers” 
(illegally drawing multiple salaries), collection of salaries by chronic absentees and outright theft 
of payroll cash. Under the IMF Stand-By Arrangement with Iraq, the GoI committed to reduce the 
number of employees through natural attrition (World Bank Group, 2018b: 9). 
Electricity supply 
Iraq’s electricity sector suffers from a series of simultaneous and compounding challenges, which 
makes it unable to generate adequate revenue to sustain itself or to improve services for 
consumers. Years of neglect have led to a dilapidated grid infrastructure with low operational 
efficiency and high levels of losses. The sector depends on government direct budgetary 
support, implicit fuel subsides and guarantees to undertake capital investments and finance its 
operational expenditure (World Bank Group, 2018b: 26). Technical losses, poor collection and 
tariffs below costs have made energy production a costly and increasing liability for the GoI 
(World Bank Group, 2018b: 6). The 2014 World Bank poverty assessment (cited in World Bank 
Group, 2018b: 6) shows that Iraqi households and consumers receive an average of 14.6 hours 
of electricity per day, of which only 7.6 hours per day is provided by the electricity grid, leaving 
Iraqis having to rely on expensive and polluting diesel generators for power (World Bank, 2017: 
89).  Furthermore, Iraq’s distribution system, outside KRG, has deteriorated owing to poor 
design, lack of maintenance, and electricity theft, resulting in large distribution losses, low voltage 
level, and frequent disconnections (World Bank Group, 2018b: 6). Low operational efficiency, 
high levels of electricity losses, and obsolete network equipment have led to average levels of 
aggregate technical and commercial losses of around 40% of total electricity generated (World 
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Bank, 2017: 89). This means that nearly half of the energy transferred to the distribution network 
after being generated is lost before any revenue can be collected. Cost recovery is also 
extremely low, and the collected revenues cover only about 10% of the operational expenditures 
(World Bank, 2017: 89-90). Iraq has made significant progress in restoring its power generation 
from a peak demand supply of about 5GW in 2005 to 14GW in 2016, but continues to face 
challenges, including high demand growth of over 10% per annum (World Bank Group, 2018b: 
26). 
Since late 2015, the GoI has started to reform and restructure the sector, to gradually bring it up 
to international industry standards. A new Electricity Law was issued in March 2017, which 
provides, for the first time, the legal framework for the sector’s reforms and governance. Results 
in the recent past have been mixed but promising regarding increased sector revenues from 
electricity sales (with first pilot areas in Zaiyoni, Yarmouk and Harthiya in Baghdad). The tariff 
structure adopted in January 2018 simplified the number of tariffs, but did not remove subsidies 
for large electricity residential consumers (World Bank Group, 2018b: 28). The GoI has 
committed to continue the reform process to achieve fiscal sustainability in a five-year period 
(World Bank Group, 2018b: 30). 
Transport 
Iraq’s transport network is weak, with the underdevelopment of transport infrastructure for all 
modes, including roads, railways, ports and airports. Unpaved roads inadequately serve most of 
the Iraqi population. The poor condition of the transport infrastructure and lack of transport 
services has significantly affected the mobility of Iraqis, particularly the poor, and especially in 
rural areas. This undermines connections between regions, reducing the potential economic and 
social interactions between them (World Bank, 2017: 90).The lack of a sector strategy, chronic 
underfunding, weak institutions, and a complex conflict-affected environment compound the 
problem. The main problem is a lack of capital investment for periodic maintenance and new 
development to maintain basic standards - underfunding rather than under-execution is the key 
constraint to transport in Iraq (World Bank, 2017: 90).  
Water supply and sanitation 
Iraq’s water sector has suffered from decades of conflict and sanctions that left its institutions 
weakened and that have resulted in under-investment and continuing deterioration of its 
infrastructure assets (World Bank, 2017: 97). The GoI provides most of the funds for the sector 
as consumers contribute very little. The high cost to operate and maintain the current water 
infrastructure is a significant fiscal burden, as there is a large gap between the cost of producing 
a cubic meter of water and the cost of the water supply and sanitation services as billed to users. 
Revenues cover only a small fraction of the system’s operational and maintenance costs. The 
low quality of services has resulted in the private sector picking up where the public sector has 
failed. The private sector fills the gaps, especially in the provision of drinking water and of 
sanitary facilities, by selling bottled or desalinated water or booster pumps and by installing 
septic tanks (World Bank, 2017: 98).  
Health 
According to the World Bank’s SCD of Iraq in 2017, Iraq’s health care capacity has been 
severely undermined by the effects of various wars, international sanctions, sectarian violence, 
political instability, and fiscal pressures. The severe deterioration of health infrastructure, the 
7 
difficulty in accessing health care, poor public health services including water and sanitation, 
malnutrition, and social fragility are all factors that undermine the health conditions of Iraqis today 
(World Bank, 2017: 82). Access to health services is limited, and geographical disparities are 
significant. In the public sector, health services are provided through a network of primary health 
care centres (PHCC) and public hospitals at very low charges. The main centres are located in 
urban areas with smaller centres in rural areas. Poor organisation and shortages of staff and 
medications are significant impediments to delivering adequate services in the PHCCs. Despite 
this, the PHCCs are recognised as very important sources of health care provision, particularly 
for the poor. For secondary and tertiary care, patients are referred from PHCCs to hospitals, 
although it is estimated that only about 40% of Iraqis have access to these referral services 
because of the inadequate number and uneven distribution of public hospitals (World Bank, 
2017: 83). Secondary and tertiary care are also provided by small private hospitals, but the costs 
of private health care must be met out-of-pocket, which is well beyond the reach of many Iraqis 
(World Bank, 2017: 83).  
Countrywide between 2003 and 2012, the absolute number of PHCCs increased in all 
governorates, however the increases were partially, and in some cases totally, offset by the high 
rate of population growth (World Bank, 2017: 83). The large number of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) as well as refugees further exacerbates the challenges facing the health sector. 
The distribution of public and private hospitals is very uneven across the country. In most central 
and southern governorates, the limited growth in the number of hospitals was completely offset 
by population growth. In general, efforts to expand the provision of health services were hindered 
by the high rate of population growth. The relatively better condition of health infrastructure in 
Kurdistan is due to the relative state of security and stability there since 1991. The widening gap 
in health infrastructure between the Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraq is also related to the 
expansion of the private sector, which has invested in 23 new private hospitals in the region 
since 2007 (Cetorelli and Shabila, 2014 cited in World Bank, 2017: 83).  
Education 
More than 5,300 schools across the country have been destroyed, damaged, or converted into 
shelters for displaced families due to the ISIS crises. In northern Iraq, nearly 14,000 teachers 
were forced to flee violence. Resources to cover the immediate and long-term needs of the 
population affected by the conflict are severely stretched, and these new challenges have 
increased disparities among the different regions across the country in terms of access to and 
the provision of education (World Bank, 2017: 81). Increasing access to education for those in 
rural areas, for girls, and for vulnerable populations must also be a priority. According to the 
World Bank’s SCD, the government has made significant strides in increasing access to 
education despite extremely challenging conditions and has achieved impressive increases in 
enrolment rates at the primary level and moderate increases at the intermediate level (World 
Bank, 2017: 81). The KRI has achieved notable advances in all aspects of its education system 
(World Bank, 2017: 81). The region established more than 2,200 kindergarten through grade 12 
(K–12) schools, 5 technical institutes, and 4 public universities between 2003 and 2012. Net 
enrolment at the secondary level rose substantially from 20% to 89% (World Bank, 2017: 81).  
However, according to a report by Unicef from 2017, Iraq’s education budget for 2015-2016 was 
just 5.7% of government spending, a 15% drop from 2013-2014, and below the United Nations 
recommended allocation of 20% of national budgets to education. The report also highlights that 
around 355,000 internally displaced children remain out of school in Iraq, representing 48.3% of 
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the total internally displaced school-age children. In conflict-affected governorates such as Salah 
al-Din and Diyala more than 90% of school-age children are left out of the education system. 
Overall, a large proportion of school-age internally displaced children are missing an opportunity 
to receive their education (Unicef, 2017: i). Spending per student was significantly lower in KRI 
compared to the rest of Iraq. Infrastructure spending, though, has remained almost non-existent. 
One out of every two public schools either requires rehabilitation or is unqualified which means 
that they do not meet national school construction standards. The growth of private schools has 
far outpaced growth in the public system (Unicef, 2017: ii). 
Security and rule of law 
A central challenge to Iraqi state-building is the weakness of its judiciary. Since 2003, the Iraqi 
judiciary has fallen prey to political interference and pressure, corruption and bribery, religious 
interests and tribal forces (Mansour, 2018: 24). Many Iraqis have turned to tribal bodies to settle 
disputes due to the lack of trust in or access to the courts (Mansour, 2018: 24). Another flaw in 
the judicial system is the relative impunity given to certain non-state actors, including paramilitary 
groups. Calls to reform the 2005 Iraqi constitution have also made little progress (for more 
information see Mansour, 2018).  
Community or regional forces, militia forces, and other local security actors have long existed in 
Iraq. However, as ISIS swept through central and northern Iraq in 2014, local, hybrid and sub-
state security forces (LHSFs) mobilised to resist. These sub-state and local forces provided an 
important bulwark against ISIS, filling gaps in the Iraqi Security Forces and holding territory 
regained from ISIS (Gaston & Derzsi-Horváth, 2018: 1). Gaston & Derzsi-Horváth (2018) 
explored the role these LHSFs were playing in local communities in Iraq and the impact for local 
and national dynamics. Critical among these forces were the long-standing KRG forces 
(Peshmerga), and the predominantly Shia Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). The PMF (also 
known as al-hashd ash-sha’abi, or simply hashd) is an umbrella group of different militia or sub-
state forces that was granted formal status by the GoI in November, 2016. A plethora of smaller 
forces drawn from local communities taken by ISIS also emerged, including Sunni tribal forces, 
and Turkmen, Yezidi, Christian and other minority defence forces (Gaston & Derzsi-Horváth, 
2018; also see Mansour, 2018 for more detailed information on the tensions between these 
different groups). 
Gaston & Derzsi-Horváth (2018: 1) highlight that as LHSFs have grown and strengthened, they 
have increasingly assumed responsibility for security, governance, and critical services in north 
and central Iraq. In some areas, these LHSFs have had a positive influence, providing security, 
allowing for reconstruction and regular governance activities to take place, and enabling aid. For 
example, the PMF, particularly the Badr Organisation, having in large part become the police in 
some areas, and gained popular support (LSE Middle East Centre, 2018: 12). In other areas, the 
positive role of the LHSFs in ousting ISIS was counter-balanced by their forces’ criminal, 
abusive, and predatory behaviour. Extrajudicial violence has also increased. This fragmentation 
of authority and the sheer number of mobilised forces, with conflicting allegiances and agendas, 
pose significant challenges for the future strength of rule of law and governance in Iraq, as well 
as overall stability (Gaston & Derzsi-Horváth, 2018: 6).  
9 
4. Specific regional state capabilities 
Areas affected by the war against ISIS  
The cities and towns liberated from ISIS have faced immediate and acute food, healthcare, and 
water-sanitation challenges and wide public service-provision shortcomings. As such, the short-
term state-rebuilding and stabilisation process is fragile (Mansour, 2018: 6). From Salahadeen, 
Anbar, Nineveh and Diyala, the resumption of key public services has played a central role in the 
successes of bottom-up stabilisation. Yet, challenges remain. In Mosul, only around 10% of 
citizens surveyed thought the local municipality was in the best position to provide assistance 
(Mansour, 2018: 8). The Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS) was established in April 2015 
and aims to help the GoI stabilise cities and districts liberated from ISIS and promote post-
conflict recovery in these areas (UNDP Iraq, 2017: 1). FFS teams are rehabilitating water, 
sanitation and electricity grids in 23 liberated towns in Anbar, Nineveh, Salah al-Din, Diyala, and 
Kirkuk governorates. Bridges, schools, health centres, pharmacies, hospitals, universities and 
administrative buildings are being repaired (UNDP Iraq, 2017: 1). 
Security and explosive hazards 
Cities that ISIS occupied for longer had greater levels of destruction and now face higher levels 
of explosive hazards [from mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unexploded 
ordnances]. The presence of these explosives undermines stabilisation efforts. While cities such 
as Tikrit, which spent less time under occupation by ISIS, have lower levels of contamination, the 
organisation planted explosive hazards more systematically in cities such as Ramadi, Fallujah 
and Mosul, where it had additional time to prepare defences. In Nineveh3, the threat of explosive 
hazards is particularly high given the importance that ISIS gave to the province and to the city of 
Mosul (Mansour, 2018: 6). Iraq had taken a novel approach to explosive hazard mitigation in an 
effort to get civilians back home more quickly. Rather than wait until areas were fully secure, in 
Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah, demining contractors moved in directly behind the hold forces that 
arrived to secure areas after the initial combat phase. These efforts were focused on clearing key 
infrastructure to enable public services to resume: water and power lines and sewage plants 
were first, followed by schools and health clinics. Specific locations were decided by the Iraqi 
government in consultation with the UN. This focused and rapid demining effort aimed to enable 
roads to open and essential services to restart. However, the current programs for explosive 
hazard mitigation are insufficient to fully handle the problem, given its magnitude. Many important 
areas remained laced with mines (Culbertson & Robinson, 2017: 31-32). 
This concern for the neutralisation of explosive hazards has primarily created a need for local 
security (and subsequently police) forces that are able to demine, impose the rule of law in the 
short- to medium-term, and then facilitate the return of IDPs in the long-term (Mansour, 2018: 6). 
A major challenge has been the limited capacity of ‘hold forces’ to stabilise and secure towns and 
cities, before working to establish locally-rooted police forces (Mansour, 2018: 7). One challenge 
is the fraught relationship between the different hold forces that fought ISIS.  Although police 
force training and recruitment can mitigate against these political disputes and issues related to 
                                                   
3 Also referred to in the literature as Ninewah, Ninewa and Ninevah.  
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the temporary hold forces, several of the hold forces seek to influence local police and security 
institutions (Mansour, 2018: 7). 
Health services 
A recent situation report for Iraq (WHO, 2018: 2) highlights that WHO and health cluster partners 
continue to work closely with the Iraqi health authorities to deliver health assistance in areas of 
need with a special focus on areas of return and camps in Nineveh, Sulyamania, Dahuk, Kirkuk, 
Anbar and West Mosul where populations have limited accessibility to health services. Much 
health infrastructure was severely damaged and shortage of health workers remains a critical 
issue. The health cluster and WHO mobile medical clinics (MMCs) and ambulances remain 
positioned in areas with critical needs and essential lifesaving medicines are delivered to ensure 
continued service delivery and referrals for patients that require specialised treatment. The 
following public health concerns were also highlighted (WHO, 2018: 3): 
• Limited accesses to health services by the population in return areas of west Mosul 
where most health facilities got damaged and Salahadeen due to shortage of health 
personnel and damaged secondary and tertiary health facilities.  
• Limited number of ambulances available in Tikrit to serve the high demand of patients 
requiring referrals from IDP camps. 
• Safe water remains a major concern for the population living in the city of west Mosul. 
Cities affected by the war against ISIS 
The above sectoral issues affect all areas under ISIS occupation (to varying degrees), but it is 
important to understand the situation and challenges faced in individual cities:   
Tikrit 
Tikrit is often viewed as a post-ISIS model for services resumption. The UN’s FFS developed a 
strategy that resulted in the relatively swift resumption of key public services. Eight health 
centres, five water facilities, seven schools and three electric facilities were reopened by the end 
of 2016. Part of the reason that Tikrit was able to resume services swiftly is that federal and local 
authorities were able to work together effectively (Mansour, 2018: 8). High numbers of IDPs have 
returned to Tikrit in part because of its largely intact road infrastructure, which enabled the swift 
return of economic activities to the city (Mansour, 2018: 9). The social and tribal make-up of the 
province has furthermore enabled infrastructure reconstruction and the resumption of public 
services (UNDP Iraq, 2016 cited in Mansour, 2018: 9). Culbertson & Robinson (2017: 47-48) 
highlight that a stabilisation strategy and plan was quickly established for Tikrit, which resulted in 
the fast rehabilitation of the main water pumping station, the reopening of health centres, and 
reestablishment of the electricity network.  
Ramadi and Fallujah 
Battles in Anbar were more drawn out and more destructive than those in Tikrit: consequently, 
rebuilding Anbar was more complicated because its bridges and roads were left damaged and 
littered with booby-traps and explosive hazards. These roads and bridges, which connect 
Anbar’s cities, are critical for the logistics of reconstruction and stabilisation (Mansour, 2018: 9). 
Rebuilding efforts in Ramadi were slower, due to the severe damage to the city during the drawn-
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out battle for control of the city (Culbertson & Robinson, 2017: 47-48). Fallujah, unlike Ramadi, 
did not experience wide-scale devastation but still presented rebuilding challenges. In Fallujah, 
road closures across Anbar province disrupted access to markets and created shortages of fresh 
produce, and exposed civilians to “extreme vulnerability” when they returned home. In Ramadi, 
there were no functioning food markets for nearly eight months after the city was liberated from 
ISIS, requiring the Iraqi government to bring in food supplies during that period. The slow return 
of markets to Ramadi, in particular, can be attributed to the generally high level of devastation of 
all major infrastructure in the city.  
Mosul 
Culbertson & Robinson (2017) highlight that in Mosul under ISIS, public services broke down and 
infrastructure was destroyed in the fighting, with particular effects on public utilities, health care, 
and education. Military operations further destroyed electricity and water infrastructure 
(Culbertson & Robinson, 2017: xii). Three-quarters of Mosul’s hospital space has been 
destroyed, as have many clinics. While eastern Mosul has begun to come back to life since its 
liberation in late January 2017 and is experiencing a high rate of returns, western Mosul 
witnessed far heavier damage to crucial civilian infrastructure and shelter, requiring greater 
financial investment and time. Thus, markets returned more easily to the east of the city than the 
west (Mansour, 2018: 9). Further information on public services in Mosul (Culbertson & 
Robinson, 2017: 41-44): 
• Public Utilities (Water, Sanitation, and Electricity): City residents had access to electricity 
for only a few hours per day under ISIS. All electrical generating stations stopped 
functioning because of a lack of fuel; the electric grid was shut down for a period because 
of cracks in the Mosul dam; and ISIS controlled private generators. The city had lacked a 
wastewater system before ISIS, and parts of the city experienced floods of wastewater. 
Solid waste collection declined under ISIS, causing a build-up of street rubbish. Water 
was not sterilised, and water treatment capacity was reduced by air raids, leaving water 
available only a few hours per day at arbitrary times. In the fighting to take East Mosul, all 
five of Mosul’s bridges were destroyed, which fractured the city’s water system because 
the pipes ran under the bridges. To deal with the city water and electricity needs, 
UNICEF moved into East Mosul to develop water and sanitation service centres, and it 
engineered a pumping system with repairs to pipes (Culbertson & Robinson, 2017: 41). 
The need for investment in utilities will not be met by these stopgap emergency efforts to 
resume water and electricity. 
• Health Care: Health services were severely degraded during ISIS’s occupation. Priority 
for medical care went to ISIS fighters instead of civilians. Gender segregation affected 
women’s access to health care. Fees were imposed for previously free services and 
medicines became less available. The WHO noted that six of Mosul’s twelve hospitals 
had been destroyed by January 2017. Basic services were neglected, as were routine 
immunisation and care for chronic diseases. The WHO and its partners started 59 mobile 
clinics in nearby communities (Culbertson & Robinson, 2017: 42-43). 
• Education: When ISIS took Mosul in 2014, it closed all of the K–12 schools, changed the 
curriculum to represent its ideology, and then reopened the schools. The quality of 
education declined, and ISIS charged fees for school attendance, which had previously 
been free. The combination of these factors led many parents not to send their children 
to school, causing a drop in school attendance. ISIS shut down Mosul’s universities, later 
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reopening only departments related to medicine, engineering and education. Located in 
East Mosul, much of the campus of Mosul University was destroyed in the fighting. 
Multiple interviewees noted that the lack of open K–12 schools and universities poses a 
barrier to IDPs returning home (Culbertson & Robinson, 2017: 43-44). 
• Infrastructure: Closely intertwined with public service provision is infrastructure. A 
significant amount of infrastructure (both public and private) in Mosul was destroyed, both 
by ISIS during the occupation and by Coalition forces during the campaign to liberate 
Mosul. By August 2016, the United Nations estimated that 50-75% of Mosul’s 
government infrastructure had been destroyed, and 60-75% of its manufacturing and 
industrial enterprises (Culbertson & Robinson, 2017: 44). 
Basra and Southern Iraq 
Although more stable than other parts of Iraq, the predominantly Shia southern provinces face 
challenges vis-à-vis the central government. Although it presides over most of Iraq’s oil, Basra 
has suffered from power blackouts, drug epidemics, the mismanagement of garbage and 
corruption (Mansour, 2018: 26). Estimates from the World Bank’s SCD for Iraq (World Bank, 
2017: 29), indicate that multidimensional poverty index (MPI) in Iraq – poor health and education 
outcomes and limited access to essential services – is at 35%, which is higher than consumption 
poverty. The South suffers from the highest MPI and consumption poverty rates (World Bank, 
2017: 29). Of the various factors that contribute to the MPI, a lack of sanitation, inadequate 
electricity, and poor nutrition are among the most prevalent deprivations in the country. 
Baghdad 
In January 2018, the World Bank announced a US$210 million project The Baghdad Water 
Supply and Sewerage Improvement Project to improve the quality of drinking water supply and 
wastewater services to 5 million residents in Baghdad (http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2018/01/31/iraq-5-million-residents-in-baghdad-to-benefit-from-improved-water-supply-
and-wastewater-services). Highlighting that they currently suffer from water shortages and the 
outbreak of waterborne diseases due to inadequate infrastructure, rapid population growth, and 
the inflow of IDPs. The press release highlights that residents of Baghdad deal with daily water 
service interruptions, especially during the hot summer months. Leakage from sewer pipes 
contaminates potable water networks and groundwater aquifers, which aggravates health and 
environmental problems. Contaminated water supply and improper disposal of sewage force 
families to spend a significant fraction of their income on medical treatment and to purchase 
bottled water. 
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
There have been some recent developments that may influence the delivery of public services in 
KRI in the near future. In March 2018, US officials announced the Iraqi Governance Performance 
and Accountability (IGPA) program, aiming to help the KRG meet the needs of its people through 
better governance and delivery of services (see 
http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/1203181). In April 2018, the KRG introduced a new 
project Khizmat aimed at decreasing bureaucracy and enhancing public services (see 
http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/120420183). 
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Debt crises and public-sector salaries 
In KRI, even before the administrative separation, loyalty to the regime was often rewarded by 
putting followers on the public payroll. This practice has continued and even intensified after 
2003, and fraud and abuse have become commonplace (DeWeaver, 2017: 3). In an analysis and 
commentary piece for the US Institute of Peace, Snow (2018) highlights the issues around the 
insolvency of the KRG. Although precise data on the KRG’s debts, revenue and regional GDP 
are not available, Snow (2018) estimates that the KRG debt is at least US$17 billion, a level that 
is probably over 100% of the region’s GDP. This is due to a number of economic setbacks 
suffered by KRG since 2013, including the crash in oil prices, the cost of fighting ISIS and 
sheltering IDPs, and sharp cuts in revenue transfers from Baghdad. The KRG’s fiscal problems 
were compounded by the central government retaking control of oil wells around Kirkuk in late 
2017. To keep the KRG and the region’s economy afloat, the KRG ran up debts with a variety of 
creditors. The KRG owes billions of dollars in back pay to civil servants, who constitute 50% of 
the region’s labour force (Snow, 2018). Prior to the 2014 crisis, the regional government relied on 
its share of the Iraqi federal budget for around 90% of its revenue, 70% of which was spent on 
salaries, pensions, and stipends (World Bank Group, 2016 cited in DeWeaver, 2017: 2). Since 
the start of the crisis in mid-2014, the government has consistently been short of funds to pay 
employees. Subsidies for refined products and electricity have also been a significant burden on 
the KRG budget (DeWeaver, 2017: 6). 
Political trust between the GoI and KRG remains low, after the latter held a referendum on 
independence in September 2017 (World Bank Group, 2018b: 1). The 2018 federal budget 
proposes to reduce transfers to KRG and requires KRG to transfer the entirety of its remaining oil 
export receipts to the federal government. This lower level of transfers could result in insufficient 
funds to pay salaries in KRG to the civil servants and the military (World Bank Group, 2018b: 15). 
Since early 2018, demonstrations demanding payment of salaries have become frequent in the 
area. In January and March 2018, the federal government made transfers to pay the salaries of 
the Ministry of Health and Education, following audits to verify the number of employees and the 
amount of salaries (World Bank Group, 2018b: 15). 
Health care 
Ross et al (2017) describe the health sector work of the six-year project (starting in 2010) 
undertaken by the RAND Corporation on behalf of the KRG to study the region's situation after 
the fall of Saddam Hussein and develop strategies. The public-sector health care system in KRI 
is primarily funded through a KRG budget allocation, which depends on a payment from the 
central Iraqi government in Baghdad – the disbursement of which has not always been timely or 
dependable (Ross et al, 2017: 2). Access to public-sector health care is guaranteed by the KRG 
draft constitution, but the clinics and hospitals are overcrowded, the doctors are overworked, and 
the facilities are run down. As a result, many of those who can afford to pay out of pocket turn to 
physicians in the private sector for care (Ross et al, 2017). One particular issue that impinges on 
health system financing and delivery efficiency in the region is the problem of physician “dual 
practice” in which physicians practise in the private sector while also being employed full-time in 
the public sector. The research also found that although the overall number of primary health 
care centres was sufficient, the geographic distribution of services provided, staffing, and 
equipment were uneven (Ross et al, 2107: 3). The RAND team suggested setting up a primary 
care management information system (MIS) as a major step toward addressing these issues, 
which is now in the hands of the KRG health leaders to institutionalise. Finally, Ross et al (2017: 
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5) highlight that intensifying budgetary and critical security needs since the invasion of ISIS, and 
the influx of internally displaced Iraqis and Syrian refugees mean that the KRG’s resources have 
become severely constrained, putting the health system under even more stress than in 2010.   
IDPs 
Culbertson & Robinson (2017: 21) report that the large numbers of IDPs forced to live in 
surrounding areas of those affected by ISIS placed strains on host community public services 
(such as health care, education, water and sanitation, and electricity), as well as on markets for 
housing and jobs. For example, Erbil in KRI has experienced a 30% increase in population since 
2014 due to the 1.8 million displaced people that it hosted (Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs from 
Nineveh and other parts of Iraq). Public services such as education and health care were offered 
to the IDPs, but the ongoing financial crisis precluded associated additional funding for the 
increased demands on public services. The KRG estimated that it spent US$120 million per 
month on refugee and IDP-related expenses (Culbertson & Robinson, 2017: 21). 
5. Constraints to service delivery4 
Institutional and financial capacity 
The World Bank’s (2017: 8) SCD of Iraq highlights that institutional capacity is weak as a result of 
the decimation of the state following wars and sanctions, and the de-Ba’athification5 decisions 
taken by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). This has severely hampered reconstruction 
efforts. There are significant gaps in the existing institutional and financial structures that prevent 
the Governorates from delivering services in an efficient and effective manner. Despite the 
devolution provisions of Law 19, the Governorates continue to face a variety of constraints that 
impede their ability to deliver services (World Bank, 2016: 9). There are no clear plans for the 
transfer of staff, no clear guidelines for the reporting and accountability relationships of devolved 
staff to the Governorates and former parent Ministries, and no clarity in the organisation of the 
civil service under the decentralised context. Although the Governorates prepare their Provincial 
Development Plans through a system of consultation at the district and sub-district levels, the 
final choice of projects and their implementation continues to be essentially a centrally driven 
process (World Bank, 2016: 9). Poor coordination between federal and local authorities has 
prevented reconstruction progress in some areas (Mansour, 2018: 8).  
One legacy of Iraq’s centralised governance system is that directorates in each province 
generally have the same structure and perform the same functions in the same way. In contrast, 
institutional and individual staff capabilities within provincial directorates and the political will to 
implement reform vary across provinces (Diamond & Berkuti, 2017: 6). For several years, when 
the Iraqi government had money but failed to deliver public services, the prevailing assumption 
was that corruption was to blame. Although this assumption was not entirely unfounded, the 
                                                   
4 The findings of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium may be of interest for more general information on 
service delivery and state capacity in fragile and conflict-affected situations, although they did not undertake 
research in Iraq specifically.  
5 After the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003, the new CPA introduced a sweeping, indiscriminate de-Baathification 
process intended to rid the country of the Baath party's influence. 
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federal government’s mismanagement of resources also significantly contributed to the problem. 
Even with fewer financial resources, more effective management at the provincial level has 
improved service delivery (Diamond & Berkuti, 2017: 6).  
DeWeaver 92017: 14) emphasises the lack of a system to implement reforms as a key barrier to 
improving public sector governance in the KRG. The bureaucracy is corrupt and poorly 
managed, lacks competent staff, and is so underfunded as a result of the salary crisis that 
employees are coming in as infrequently as only once a week. Under these circumstances, there 
is hence a considerable gap between how policies are supposed to work in theory and how they 
actually turn out in practice. 
Bureaucratic bottlenecks 
Diamond & Berkuti (2017: 4) highlight that local governments in Iraq may already have the 
responsibility, authority, and resources to deliver local services but that bureaucratic bottlenecks 
prevent them from doing so. The nuances of the complex bureaucratic bottlenecks at the federal 
level reflect the deep, vested interests of the large, centralised state institutions left behind by 
Saddam Hussein. Control of the central government, which is still the largest and most desirable 
employer in Iraq, continues to represent a lucrative prize for political parties (Diamond & Berkuti, 
2017: 4). 
Political patronage and corruption 
The political changes in Iraq over the past 15 years at the central level have done little to 
diminish the notion that party loyalty supersedes governing responsibility. According to Diamond 
& Berkuti (2017: 3), political patronage is the dominant factor in all the country’s decision-making 
processes, especially those related to reforms at the federal level that will shift the control of 
resources.  
Efficient public procurement processes are often undermined by bribery and kickbacks. 
Difficulties with corruption and unreliable dispute resolution mechanisms remain common 
complaints from companies operating in Iraq. Weak public administration, lack of experienced 
staff, high insecurity, and weak oversight of government spending provide incentives and 
opportunities for corruption (World Bank Group, 2018b: 12). Many Iraqis now point to corruption, 
above sectarianism, as the root-cause of the collapses in the state-building cycle (Mansour, 
2018: 20). 
At the central government level, the combination of a weak yet resource-rich rentier state has 
allowed competing groups to capture state resources and contracts, decimate institutions, and 
undermine the development of a competitive private sector. The various power groups (such as 
sectarian and ethnic groups and militias) regard governance structures simply as means to 
capture rents and thus vie for control over them (World Bank, 2017: 19). The politicisation of 
state institutions and the robbing of state resources have undermined the effective and equitable 
delivery of services, thus exacerbating the crisis of legitimacy and the challenges to state 
authority (World Bank, 2017: 64). 
Low levels of public investment 
Diminishing resources present another, more recent, obstacle to the delivery of public services. 
Even in provinces and directorates with well-intentioned change agents, Iraq’s widening budget 
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shortfall has required government officials to do more with less, and to manage public 
expectations (Diamond & Berkuti, 2017: 3). Iraq has neglected its non-oil infrastructure, and poor 
quality services are aggravated by inadequate infrastructure and low levels of public investment 
(World Bank, 2017: 2). Overcoming some of these constraints to local capacity and financial 
management is essential (World Bank, 2017: 4). 
Extent of damage and existing infrastructure 
Service-delivery gaps in each province also depend on the availability and condition of 
infrastructure and equipment and the pressure internal migration places on the province’s 
systems (Diamond & Berkuti, 2017: 6). Another determinant of the success or failure of public 
services resumption is the extent of road and bridge damage in recently-liberated areas. Road 
infrastructure investment and repair should, as such, be a priority for economic stabilisation 
efforts. It should furthermore be coordinated effectively by the different Iraqi authorities (Mansour, 
2018: 9). 
Importance of context and local dynamics 
Iraq’s various fiscal, security, and humanitarian crises hindered the government’s ability to deliver 
the services needed for poverty reduction, social inclusion and economic development (World 
Bank Group, 2018b: 6). Changing the mind-set of stakeholders is a protracted process that can 
only be accomplished through multiple interventions. Barriers differ at the central and provincial 
levels; thus, maintaining a good understanding of the context and drivers in each ministry and 
each province is essential to optimising the project’s impact. One lesson learned from the 
Taqadum project is that this process might have been expedited had the project included a more 
formal analysis of the political economy in its decentralisation mapping-and-analysis plan 
(Diamond & Berkuti, 2017: 7). A poor local-central relationship also affects the bottom-up 
legitimacy of local actors. Many citizens in Mosul view senior Sunni political figures as propped 
up by external actors. They question whether these politicians carry any legitimacy. Nonetheless, 
international stakeholders continue to engage with the same leaders and, in doing so, assign 
legitimacy to them without taking into account shifts in local dynamics. The failure of international 
actors to focus on changing local legitimacy is detrimental to stabilisation (Mansour, 2018: 9). 
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